INTRODUCTION
The genius of the United States Constitution lies not only in what it contains, but also, ironically, in what it omits. Because it is merely a skeletal framework, the Constitution permits the specific nature of its own application to vary with the social, cultural, and political changes that inevitably accompany the progression of time.' While this has allowed the document to transcend the changing circumstances brought by the centuries, such longevity has been realized through the imposition of a burden upon each generation to redefine and reinterpret the many balances and compromises it strikes.
Among these balances is one that constitutes the focus of this Comment. The First Amendment guarantees individuals the right to exercise freely their religious convictions, 2 yet it is also clear in its pronouncement that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
3 Despite being intended as means to the common end of securing "religious liberty," 4 the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses often find themselves at odds with one another, especially as state efforts to promote and secure free exercise creep closer to the line demarcating the institutionalized preference of religion over "irreligion." 5 When this threshold is crossed, the Establishment Clause mandates the invalidation of such governmental action. 6 Indeed, the principles underlying these clauses have clashed these alone can give-this living and breathing spirit, which supplies the interpretation of the words of the written charter, would be utterly lost and gone. 24 Mich. 44, 107 (1871) .
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law.., prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]."). 
dissenting).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 537 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (" [G] overnmental preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First Amendment."); Zorach, 343 U.S. at 325 (Jackson,J., dissenting) ("The day that this country ceases to be free for irreligion it will cease to be free for religion-except for the sect that can win political power."); see also Tex. Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (holding that a sales tax exemption that is confined to religious publications violates the Establishment Clause when other publications are denied such an exemption); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion."); Edward J. Eberle on the federal level, in the context of congressional enactments aimed at securing religious liberty, 7 and on the state level regarding, for instance, school prayer." The potential for significant conflict between them also exists in areas governed primarily by local regulation," and zoning is foremost among these likely arenas of antagonism.
There may be no power at the disposal of local government more
The Court [in adopting the view embodied in Justice Stevens's Boerne concurrence] has simply misread history. One scholar who has made one of the most thorough studies of the debates of the First Congress [the body which enacted the Bill of Rights] on the adoption of the religion language of the First Amendment concluded:
All of the speakers, except [Roger] Sherman [of Connecticut] , agreed that the Bill of Rights should prohibit the new government from establishing a national religion. In addition, they did not want the govermnent to have the power deliberately to favor one religion over another. But every one of them seemed to agree that the Bill of Rights should not prevent the federal government from giving nondiscriminatory assistance to religion.... Madison, even though he privately questioned the efficacy of governmental assistance to religion, accepted the... 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with those who contend that the Establishment Clause prevents a preference for religion over irreligion). This Comment, however, takes the view that such a reading of the Framers' intent is actually a misconstruction of the true meaning of the Establishment Clause, as argued below. See infra Part II.
7 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 537 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, designed to secure the free exercise right, runs afoul of the Establishment Clause).
I See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (analyzing a Rhode Island practice regarding school prayer);Jaffrty, 472 U.S. at 61 (striking down an Alabama law prodiding for a period of silence at the beginning of the school day "for meditation or voluntary prayer"). " Naturally, because the Bill of Rights is applicable only to the federal government, Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) , the relevance of such a conflict, from a constitutional standpoint, is wholly contingent upon the incorporation of these clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment. While some have argued against the propriety of such incorporation, "[sluch arguments are unpersuasive .... While they are technically correct from a rigid perspective of original intent, they are irrelevant." MONSMA,, supra note 6, at 35. Indeed, subsequent developments in constitutional law have unambiguously held state and local governments responsible for adherence to the mandates of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) ("The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.").
capable of affecting the rights and abilities of individuals and groups to engage in given activities than zoning.' A municipality's zoning regulations may restrict the geographical areas of the municipality in which activities may be conducted; the size of properties on which those activities may transpire; the types of facilities that may be required on those properties if they are to be validly undertaken; and the conditions, such as hours of operation, under which they may be conducted.
Of course, zoning regulations have the potential to restrict secular and nonsecular activities alike. However, many jurisdictions have, to varying degrees, facilitated the implementation and expansion of religious uses to an extent not demonstrated when only secular uses have been involved. Indeed, such favoritism has been mandated by federal statutory law, most notably by the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000.11 Upon introducing this bill, Senator Orrin Hatch indicated that " [a] t the core of religious freedom is the ability for assemblies to gather and worship together.... Finding a location to do so, however, can be quite difficult when faced with pervasive land use regulations. No government shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person, assembly, or institution-(A) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.
both federal" and, especially, state common law.' Specifically, common law maxims requiring the waiver or abnormally flexible application of dimensional and use regulations of all sorts-including minimum building set-back and lot area requirements; maximum floor-area ratio and lot coverage requirements; height and parking limitations; and occupancy ceilings, to name only a few-entail the potential to affect results of this preferential variety. More fundamentally, several jurisdictions feature jurisprudential regimes that are notable for having institutionalized a positive general predisposition toward religious land uses. Often assuming the form of a maxim that nonsecular uses will be considered presumptively valid, this pro-religious stance constitutes preferential treatment in and of itself. Moreover, it may underlie determinations that any particular zoning requirement is to be relaxed where a religious land use is involved. This Comment is concerned with the applicability of zoning regulations generally to religious land uses, and as such will not focus upon any specific type of regulation.
it Se, e.g., Ehlers-Renzi v. Connelly Sch. of the Holy Child, Inc. 224 F.3d 283, 292 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that the Establishment Clause was not violated by a county zoning ordinance exempting parochial schools located on church-owned or -leased land from a special exception requirement); Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, Miss., 840 F.2d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1988 ) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause prevented the defendant municipality from excluding a mosque from its borders, even where it %as possible, at least in the de jure sense, for a permit allowing the construction of a religious structure to be granted by the city aldermen).
'. In some states, including New York, a strong presumptive validity attaches to religious uses. '6 In others, like California, such uses enjoy no preferential treatment whatsoever.
7
In many other jurisdictions, various intermediary positions have been espoused, all entailing the reservation of some special status or preference for religious land uses.
8 This Comment argues, however, that this judicially sanctioned favoritism is, as a matter of historical interpretation, modern jurisprudence, and religious liberty-focused policy considerations, a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
Instead of sanctioning such institutionalized preference for religion over irreligion, a more appropriate balance between the First Amendment Religion Clauses in the zoning context could be struck by ensuring that religious uses are subject to neutral laws of general applicability. This is an indispensable means of effectuating the end of religious liberty that is so vital to our shared constitutional tradition.
In demarcating this as an appropriate resolution to the conflict between the First Amendment Religion Clauses, the lessons of this Comment hopefully will be generalizable and will suggest a more appropriate balance between disestablishment and free exercise in other contexts within our legal order.
The Comment is structured as follows: Part I outlines the First Amendment problems posed by the exemption of religious land uses from neutral zoning laws of general applicability. Part II deals with several aspects of the historical background and intellectual traditions which should inform modern interpretations of the First Amendment Religion Clauses. Here the Comment focuses especially on the impact of (1) the ideas of John Locke and European enlightenment philosophers, (2) the early American colonial experience, (3) J. 507, 508-09 (1996) .
Constitutional objections to the placement of limits on religious freedom may also be based in the constitutions of the several states, which are free to "provide greater protection of rights than the federal constitution gives." Grace Cmty. Church, 615 A.2d at 1103 (citing Husti v. Zuckennan Prop. Enters., Ltd., 508 A.2d 735, 742 (Conn. 1986 ); see also First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992 ) ("Although we might distinguish this case from Smith 11... we decline to do so... and [we] rest our decision also on independent grounds under the Washington constitution.").
To the extent that a state constitution grants religious land uses the right to be free from neutral zoning laws of general applicability, however, that particular provision is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause of the federal Constitution. A prime example is Grace Communit Church, in which the court stated that "under the facts of the present case and considering... article seventh of the constitution of Connecticut,... the zoning regulations would be unconstitutional as applied to the plaintiff's property." 615 A.2d at 1104. If it is otherwise permissible under the Free Exercise Clause to engage in neutral regulation of a religious use, these regulations do not become Free Exercise violations if the use cannot comply with those rules. Yet to the extent that the decisions and practices detailed above rely on the First Amendment, by prohibiting the exclusion of places of worship from residential districts, they serve as the functional equivalent to that rule.
A more logical justification for the common law maxim is that, as many courts have stated, 25 religious uses are somehow inherently beneficial to the communities in which they are situated. Indeed, the fact that preferential treatment often is afforded to both religious and educational land uses 2 " indicates a belief that such uses share characteristics that render their presence within a community particularly desirable. Permitting the use despite its nonconformance with neutral zoning laws, according to this rationale, would be legitimized on policy grounds. Univ. v. Bagnardi, 503 N.E.2d 509,514 (N.Y. 1986 ) ("Because of the inherently beneficial nature of churches.., to the public, we held that the total exclusion of such institutions from a residential district serves no end that is reasonably related to the morals, health, welfare and safety of the community.").
Ser i f a Part II (delineating the historical bases for a modem interpretation of the First Amendment Religion Clauses).
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
To completely appreciate the offense done to the Establishment Clause by a judicially legitimized preference for places of worship as opposed to other land uses, it is necessary to understand the ideals that drove Madison, as he framed the First Amendment, 9 and the individuals upon whose ideas he reliedY30
Of course, a truly comprehensive survey of the entire body of thought reflected in the words and spirit of the Religion Clauses would require a multivolume work, and in truth, it is doubtful that even such an extensive undertaking could truly contemplate all of the relevant intellectual strains.
'
Here the aim is far more modest-this Comment merely seeks to provide a sampling of the notions of the most salient thinkers and of the sorts of philosophical approaches embodied in their works, as gauged by their impact upon Madison.
Once this theoretical background is established, the inconsistency between these underpinnings and a common law preference for religious land uses becomes clear. It also becomes possible to offer a resolution to this conflict in the specific context of "religious zoning," and further, to suggest the best way in which the Religion Clauses can be reconciled with each other, regardless of the specific circumstances. The important point, worth keeping in mind when considering this issue, is that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were intended as means to a common end; in enacting both, the Framers intended to create a barrier against the usurpation of religious freedom.-' Indeed, this protection was an essential element of the natural rights tradition that animated Jefferson, Madison, and the rest of the Framers." Upon consideration, the logic undergirding the need for both First Amendment Religion Clauses appears clear; an individual's liberty to practice her chosen religion can be usurped just as easily by the institutionalization of a state-sponsored preference for a set of beliefs which differs from her own as through direct inhibition of her favored creed. Therefore, both forms of interference must be prohibited in order to ensure the maintenance of religious freedom.
,. See Wallace v. Jaffrey, 472 U.S. 38, 68 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (" [The] common purpose [of the First Amendment Religion Clauses] is to secure religious liberty.... On these principles the Court has been and remains unanimous." (citation omitted)); see also Comment, supra note 31, at 769 (stating that the intent of the First Amendment was, at least in part, to protect the free exercise of religion by placing all religious matters beyond the purview of state authority). Specifically, the Court has been clear in its repeated assertions that through these provisions, "'[tihe structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.'" Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) who were the source of the power and legitimacy of the state.
Lockean sociopolitical theory thus featured a respect for the right of individuals to pursue life's rudimentary fulfillments and freedoms, a liberty endowed unto them by nothing more than the humanity inherent in their beings. Consequently, the system of governance established by Locke's disciples would take no part in the "defen [se] and propagat[ion] of moral and religious truths." 41 To them, the realms of governance, where state power exists solely to facilitate and protect indixidual freedoms, and religion, where God reigns supreme, were to be kept absolutely separate. 2 Indeed, the rationale behind the "Christian state," 3 which characterized Locke's time, was undermined by his liberal theory of political relations, which "assigns [the state] the very mundane and practical role of protecting private rights." " Hence, given their own liberal intellectual inclinations, the Framers' placement of barriers between the government and religion is fairly unsurprising.
Yet while Locke wrote with unmatched influence upon the American mindset, his theories drew on English experiences. While conceptually momentous and easily applicable within the American context, they were also the product of another time, over a century before the Framers of the First Amendment set about their drafting. It was only natural, then, for the Framers to draw not only upon European theory, but also upon American experience. Therefore, it Amendment as designed to prohibit the establishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent discrimination among sects. He did not see it as requiring neutrality on the part of government between religion and 'irreligion."'); MALBIN, qifwa note 6, at 9 (contending similarly). However, this contention, as mentioned above, , suiipra note 6, has been consistently rejected by the United States Supreme Court. Sc'e Bd. of Educ. of Kir)as Joel Viii. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (stating that a state preference for religion over irreligion is prohibited by the Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216 (1963) ("[T] his Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the Establishment Clause forbids only g, ixernmental preference of one religion over another.").
UNJVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:1507 would be ill-advised to consider this liberal theoretical background in isolation. Long before the Enlightenment Europeans published their influential works, the American continent was settled by many individuals whose primary purpose was to escape religious • 46 persecution. Indeed, it is their struggle, and its significant influence
upon the substance of the Constitution, that renders the dictates of the First Amendment uniquely American. To contend otherwise would be to understate the extent to which the United States Constitution is more than a mere replica of its temporal predecessors,4 8 and thus to foster empirical inaccuracy.
B. The Impact of the Early American Colonists'Experience on the Framers of the First Amendment
The earliest American settlers were wholly religious people and yet they were religiously diverse. The founders of the American colonies were, relatively speaking, largely political liberals and religious non-conformists .... This was true not only of the early English immigration but even more so of the West European migration which followed in 1660 and included so many German sectaries with Anabaptist backgrounds-Mennonites, Moravians, Quakers, and so on. Different colonies also had their distinctive religious and ecclesiastical flavor due to the dominant point of view, such as that of the Puritans in Massachusetts or of the Anglicans in Virginia; but there were probably more different religious backgrounds than have been generally recognized. STOKES & PFEFFER, supra note 35, at 22.
Stokes and Pfeffer go on to explain how this diversity later would be perceived by Jefferson and Madison as conducive to liberty:
The perpetual conflict among the sects was in the long run conducive to
1A
understandably assume that the Constitution that drew upon their experiences would be geared toward the promotion of religion. In truth, some of the early colonists may not have found neutral governmental support of religion to be problematic, as the Supreme Court has declared it to be5' and as liberty-minded policy considerations must find it to be.52 Despite this possible divergence between the early colonists' views and the Constitution that was influenced thereby, the ideal of religious tolerance espoused by these dissenters comprises a significant portion of the conceptual backbone for modern thought and jurisprudence construing the First Amendment. To properly comprehend their views, the hardship that produced them, and the ways in which those ideas were incorporated into the Religion Clauses, it is necessary to take another, closer look at the lives and beliefs of some of the early colonists.
The persecutions that provided the impetus for many of the early settlers' migration to the New World are well documented. UNTVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 149:1507 erect religious establishments which all, whether believers or nonbelievers, would be required to support and attend. An exercise of this authority was accompanied by a repetition of many of the old-world practices and persecutions. Catholics found themselves hounded and proscribed because of their faith; Quakers who followed their conscience went to jail; Baptists were peculiarly obnoxious to certain dominant 54 Protestant sects .... Indeed, the earliest Europeans to arrive in America had no intention of creating a condition of religious liberty as we conceive of that notion today. The freedom they sought was the individual's ability to adhere to her own religious doctrines without interference from the English crown. In other words, they embraced the ideal of the "'Christian commonwealth."' 55 They merely wished to experience it on their own terms, not on those dictated by Charles 1.56
As alluded to above, this predilection was not limited to theory, and the civil magistrates of Massachusetts Bay and Connecticut did more than merely present those who held views divergent from their own with an intolerant ideological disposition. Indeed, consistent with their own leanings and their colonial charters, the churches in those colonies were established, or funded by the entirety of the colonial populace, regardless of any particular individual's membership status. 7 In sum, as Isaac Kramnick and R. Laurence
Everson, 330 U.S. at 9-10 (citation omitted). 
C. The Impact of Roger Williams on the Framers of the First Amendment
Williams's influence upon the First Amendment is important not only in that it is the product of an early-American perspective. It is also significant because Williams's ideas were those of a devoutly religious individual and therefore may not be dismissed as the critique of one at odds with Christianity generally. Indeed, his views were firmly rooted in his own religious convictions, which dictated that "his Christian God had fixed a narrow path of religious duty for his chosen saints, a duty that required them to protect correct Christian practice from worldly corruption, and.., the number of true Christians would always be a small proportion of the population in any society...."' Consequently, he rejected the concept of a nation under God as "arrogant blasphemy." 6 ' Yet, for all of their controversial character, these ideas would have remained mere abstract notions had no opportunity existed for their application. But almost immediately upon arriving in Massachusetts in 1630, Williams was presented with the occasion to assert these ideas in a significant and divisive way.
Notably, his transatlantic voyage was itself largely impelled by the overbearing close rule of his "ecclesiastical superiors in the person [ To the extent that such skeptical arguments are empirically grounded, however, any lack of direct reliance should not be mistaken for an overall lack of influence by Roger Williams. Even Eberle continues:
"Williams thus originated the evangelical strand of separation that influenced the framing of the First Amendment religious protections, complementing the more secular theories of separation of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison." 7° Indeed, the problem for those who contest Roger Williams's influence is that his ideas concerning religious toleration and the experiences that produced them, because widely shared, were by the late eighteenth century indelibly stamped upon American political and religious consciousness.
7 1 Thus, it is logical to assert that his influence is visible in the direct products of that mindset: the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.
D. The Impact of the Ideas and Experiences of the Framers on the Substance of the First Amendment
Although he drew heavily on the work of his intellectual predecessors, James Madison was also influenced by his own ideas and those of his American contemporaries. Yet this seminal essay was not the first instance in which James Madison had considered the issue of how best to effectuate religious liberty. In 1776, he had co-authored with George Mason the Virginia Declaration of Rights, and he "is credited with changing it from a mere statement of the principle of tolerance to the first official legislative pronouncement that freedom of conscience and religion are inherent rights of the individual. ''4 In 1779, as a member of the Virginia General Assembly, Madison lent his unabashed support to Thomas Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, which embodied the arguments against the "church tax" delineated above.
Madison in fact penned the Remonstrance both in support of this Bill and in opposition to the tax. Thus, Madison's opposition to "every form and degree of official relation between religion and civil authority" 6 had been well conceived before the 1791 drafting of the First Amendment. During the debate surrounding the ratification of that Amendment, Madison argued for a separation of precisely the sort he had advocated in his home state in years past. Nonetheless, there was one notable difference between this debate and that which had transpired in Virginia. Unlike the latter, the new constitutional amendment entailed an important aspect of federalism, around which revolves a wealth of recent debate concerning the meaning of the First Amendment Religion Clauses.8' Despite his insistence upon protecting the essential liberty of conscience through the separation of the civil and religious realms, Madison was also a strong proponent of the rights of the sovereign states vis-a-vis the federal government. Thus, some have interpreted statements such as his declaration that "It]here is not a shadow of right in the general government to intermeddle with religion" s as evidence that he intended "the Religion Clauses solely to assign jurisdiction over religious liberty issues to the states,"'' and not as placing substantive federal limits on cil-religious conjunction in the states.
Although this view has garnered significant support, "0 its reception has not been uniformly hospitable."' Indeed, many constitutional law scholars adhere to the view that the First Amendment places substantive limits on governmental entanglement with religion. " q ' S , Steinberg, supra note 87, at 1002-03 n.76 ("Madison's terse statement that the federal government could not 'intermeddle with religion' is susceptible to interpretations other than the jurisdictional interpretation advocated by Professor Smith."). Steinberg goes on to declare that "It]he statements cited by Professor Smith are ambiguous, and subject to more than one plausible interpretation. At best, such statements provide limited support for Professor Smith's thesis that the Framers did not enact some substantive principle when they adopted the Religion Clauses." Id. at 1003.
S, id. at 1002 (describing the substantive significance attributed by many to the First Amendment). It is also possible that such a stance was the product of a political strategy aimed at securing the votes of the large Baptist contingent of the Virginia electorate, whose support at the polls proved crucial in Madison's defeat of James Moreover, even if the First Amendment Religion Clauses were intended to be jurisdictional only, this does not mean that Madison favored a Christian state, or even a derivative thereof, as some purport.9 3 Here it is worth emphasizing that Jefferson's ideas also played a large part in framing the First Amendment, and Jefferson's advocacy of strict separation is unquestioned." But even if we are to scrutinize Madison in particular, we find that the view of individual religious liberty expressed in the Remonstrance is reconcilable with his strong notion of federalism. While he arguably might have intended to indicate in the First Amendment that the states should be left "free to deal with the citizen in religious matters in whatever manner they chose," 9 5 as long as such measures did not "infringe the rights of very point of his Remonstrance, targeted directly at the Virginia legislature. The argument that Madison in fact sought something short of an absolute separation as a means of benefiting religion generally, that is, without impeding any individual's "freedom of conscience," 8 mistakes such a scheme for his actual goal of defending religious liberty via complete separation. " As Professor Monsma states: "[i]n defending religious liberty, and church-state separation as the means to attain it, Madison consistently argued that such separation would be good for religion as well as for government.,,""' Indeed, as will be argued below, Madison recognized that an absolute separation is essential if religious freedom is to be ensured. This conception of the Religion Clauses as substantive guarantees of governmental noninvolvement with religion was secured by the incorporation of the clauses into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in the mid-twentieth century, thereby rendering them applicable to the states.""
In sum, the First Amendment was the product of ideas drawn from the natural-rights intellectual tradition. Synthesized by the "common unifying force of Madison's life, thought and sponsorship,".
2 these notions find a unitary voice in the opening to the Bill of Rights. Whether intended as a means of protecting religion from civil authority, individual rights from ecclesiastical power, or, as is more likely, both, the First Amendment prohibits any governmental entity from declaring one denomination as its official religion. More RLv. 1579, 1581 (1996) .
-For one of many possible examples, consider:.
[N]either the text of the Establishment Clause nor its historical background support the view that the Clause merely summed up Madison's andJefferson's vieus regarding church-state relationships, much less the view that the Clause require., a complete separation between religion and government prohibiting all government aid to or encouragement of religion. Certainly the first several generations of American legislators (including those who actually drafted the YAmendment) did not think that government aid to or encouragement of religion was inconsistent with the Religion Clauses. Rbertson, supra note 93, at 270-71. In fact, the Framers likely believed that the Religion Clauses themselves encouraged religion, but that they did so by preventing the govermnent from impacting negatively upon it in any direct way. generally, the Amendment mandates the complete separation of church and state, 3 thereby rendering a state preference for religion generally equally problematic. It is these principles that necessarily underpin any wise and jurisprudentially defensible approach to the Religion Clauses, and that must guide our appraisal of the questions presented within the context of preferential zoning.
MONS.U, supra

III. AN ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLICY-BASED JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE EXEMPTION OF RELIGIOUS LAND USES FROM NEUTRAL, GENERALLY APPLICABLE ZONING REGULATIONS
I will focus primarily on the policy-based justification for the maxim that neutral zoning laws may not exclude religious uses from residential districts, namely that such uses are inherently beneficial to the community. The force of any line of reasoning that takes issue with this justification would be virtually nil, however, if there existed a second, legitimate basis for curtailing the power of zoning laws, namely the Free Exercise Clause. I will therefore argue briefly that the Clause imposes no such limitation.
A. The Free Exercise Clause as a PotentialJustification for the Exemption of Religious Land Uses from Neutral, Generally Applicable Zoning Regulations
We may start from the baseline proposition that, as a matter of Free Exercise jurisprudence, mosques, temples, churches, and the like may be subjected to neutral, generally applicable laws.'6-, Given this, those who contend that the Free Exercise Clause°' mandates the see infra text accompanying notes 106-07 (discussing free exercise jurisprudence prior to 1990). I05 1 am referring here to the Free Exercise Clause of the Federal Constitution. This, of course, is not technically the only other possible source of such a doctrine. Such preference could be predicated upon a provision of a state constitution that is more expansive in its free exercise protections than the federal version. That a state's constitution may be more protective of individual rights in this sense is undisputed. See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992) (declaring that such expansiveness is unproblematic). To the extent that this protection rises to the level of a state-backed, institutionalized preference for religion generally, however, exemption of religious uses from neutral, generally applicable zoning regulations must necessarily defend the following proposition: the Free Exercise Clause draws a line between zoning regulations with which a religious use is able to comply and those that make demands that the use is unable to meet. Because compliance with pertinent zoning regulations is a necessary precursor to the development or use of a structure (in the absence of a variance sanctioning noncompliance therewith), a group that is unable to conform its place of worship to the mandates of a zoning law will be prohibited from using the subject property for its desired religious purpose. This law, they would conclude, may therefore be said to impede the members' exercise of their religious beliefs, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause.
This sort of argument, although interesting, simply finds no support in current Free Exercise jurisprudence.
Until 1990, proponents of such a view would have had some legal foundation for the position; the governing authority was the ruling of the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner, which expounded a strict-scrutiny test for governmental actions that substantially burdened religion." ' Thus, unless such actions were narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental purpose, Sherbert deemed them violative of the Free Exercise Clause. But in 1990, the Court drastically shifted direction, careening down what may be considered a substantially pro-regulatory avenue. In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith, Sherbert's compelling interest test was functionally abandoned, as the Court reaffirmed that "the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes) .
'' ,7
Thus, "a claimant whose religious practice is burdened by a facially 'generally applicable' and 'neutral' law can obtain relief only by carrying the heavy burden of proving that there is an unconstitutional motivation behind the law and, thus, that it is not truly neutral or it violates the federal Establishment Clause. Thus, such preferences in the context of zoning are not legitimized as based on a highly expansive state analog to the federal Free Exercise Clause. See supra note 21 (discussing this line of reasoning).
l'. 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) ; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513
(1997) (describing the Slerbert approach to the Free Exercise Clause as asking whether a law substantially burdens a religious practice and whether there is a compelling interestjustif'ing the burden). contrary-that is, that neutral zoning regulations may not serve to prevent a group from employing a piece of property for any religious purpose it pleases-is actually to take issue with the notion that such uses should be subject to generally applicable regulations at all, as a regulation that entails no incentive for compliance is a functional nonentity. While this might have been a viable reading during the Sherbert era, the strict-scrutiny approach has been obviated by Smith.
B. PolicT-Based Reasoning as a PotentialJustification for the Exclusion of Religious Land Uses from Neutral, Generally Applicable Zoning Regulations
Given the shortcomings of the free exercise argument delineated above, if zoning regulations are to be found impermissible when they functionally exclude religious uses, the holding may not be viably predicated upon that Clause. Instead, policy-based reasoning rooted in a preference for religion would necessarily inform such a doctrine, and this is where the First Amendment is a doctrinal impediment.
One explicit articulation of this pro-religious, policy-based reasoning was laid down in Diocese of Rochester v. Planning Board, in which the New York Court of Appeals declared that "[a] church... No. 90-2406 , 1991 WL 179102, at *4 (4th Cir. 1991 , is particularly instructive here. In that case, the court held that zoning laws could theoretically violate the Free Exercise Clause by absolutely (i.e., explicitly) prohibiting religious uses on any property or by pointedly curtailing "particular uses having special religious significance." Id. at *4. However, zoning regulations of that sort would not be truly neutral, as alluded to aboxe. S, Keetch & Richards, supra note 108, at 727 (noting that a claimant must prove that a zoning law which purportedly violates the Free Exercise Clause "is not truly neutral or generally applicable"); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 (1993) (holding that a regulation that is not generally applicable must advance compelling interests and be narrowly tailored in pursuit of these interests in order to curtail religious practice). The Christ College court concluded that "[tihe fact that local regulations limit the geographical options of a religious [use] ... does not prove that any party's right to free exercise is thereby burdened." Chiit College, 1991 WL 179102, at *4.
Interestingly, the court did state that " [t] here must at least be some nexus between the government regulation-here, a zoning law-and impairment of ability to carry out a religious mission [for the law to violate the Free Exercise Clause]," id. at *4, thereby implying that laws with which a congregation is unable or possibly unwilling to comply may be unconstitutional. To the extent that this is an accurate reading of the Christ Clhg0, holding, however, it is at odds ith Smith. Indeed, as indicated by the abo.c argument concerning the functional nullification of the zoning laws as applied to religious uses that would stem from such a doctrine, such a holding would eviscerate the core holding of Smith and must therefore be incorrect as a matter of law.
III Sea Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (holding that neutral laws of general applicability may apply to religious land uses without violating the Free Exercise Clause).
[is, in itself,] clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general welfare. The church is the teacher and guardian of morals,"" and "'is considered an aid to the general welfare. ' ' ." While the courts of only a few states have explicitly articulated this line of reasoning," 7 it is implicit in the decisions of numerous otherjurisdictions that are often couched in free exercise terms.'" Yet their use of free exercise language demonstrates that even these tribunals have recognized the inadequacy of such policy-based lines of reasoning.
As evidence of the inclusion of an implicit, pro-religious bias in the court-fashioned (and statutory) limits on zoning vis-a-vis religious land uses, consider, for example, the following statement: "where private schools [as opposed to parochial schools] are involved... exclusion may well be unrelated to the public health, safety, morals, or the general welfare, and therefore not be reasonably related to the police power."" 9 Parochial schools, by contrast, have often been treated as excludable only where such action is reasonably related to the police power."° Indeed, this notion that churches, temples, synagogues, and the like are entitled to disparately favorable treatment as compared to secular land uses is widespread. Under these circumstances, the ordinance does not enjoy presumptive validity and the burden of [proving that the regulation is related to the public health, safety and morals] shifts to the city." (citations omitted)); Chaminade Coll. Preparatory, Inc. v. City of Creve Coeur, 956 S.W.2d 440, 441-42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997) ("'Any regulatory power a How could that be? Certainly these courts' purported reliance on the Free Exercise Clause must be pretextual. The import of Smith, which has been unambiguously rendered applicable within the zoning context, ' is that the standard for determining whether a particular governmental regulation violates the Free Exercise Clause is not whether the law furthers the public health, safety, morals, or welfare. That sort of compelling interest analysis is precisely the interpretive mode expounded in Sherbert, which was rejected by Smith."' In a telling passage, the Smith Court stated:
[Ilf "compelling interest" really means what it says ... many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference," and precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we municipality may have over churches is purely for safety regulation.'" (quoting Vill. Lutheran Church v. City of Ladue, 935 S.W.2d 720, 722 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997))); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 185 (Wash. 1992) ("We hold that the City's interest in preservation of esthetic and historic structures is not compelling and it does not justify , the infringement of First Covenant's right to freely exercise religion. The possible loss of significant architectural elements is a price we must accept to guarantee the paramount right of religious freedom."). S. 872, 881 (1990) (delineating examples of constitutional rights). For purposes of this Comment, I have assumed that no such hybrid situation is at issue; in other words, that the problem is simply the conflict between a religious use and neutral zoning laws. To the extent that such a situation did arise, for example, that zoning laws functionally precluded the publishing of a religious newspaper, I suspect-though it exceeds the scope of this Comment to argue this point thoroughly-that this would not serve to reinvigorate the Sherbert standard, as the Court seems fairly interested in effectuating the notion that religious uses are neither more nor less desirable than others. Smith thus precludes insistence upon such a relationship between the regulation in question and the public welfare, or any sort of exclusion for religious uses from neutral laws of general applicability.
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Because Smith so clearly holds that the Free Exercise Clause does not require such preferential treatment, the insistence upon bestowing uniquely preferential treatment upon religious uses must be the product of a belief that such uses are simply different from others, in a positive sense. This conflict, however, highlights precisely the sense in which the First Amendment does speak to such doctrinal developments. Put in the simplest possible terms, the Establishment Clause absolutely precludes the institutionalized preference for religion over irreligion.
26
Explicit and implicit preferences for religious land uses, therefore, violate the Establishment Clause.
When courts fashion such pro-religious doctrines, claiming that the First Amendment (specifically the Free Exercise Clause) supports their endeavors, they stretch the provision beyond its legitimate bounds. Contrarily, courts ignore the very aspect of that Amendment, the Establishment Clause, that does possess teeth in this particular context.
C. The Cultural and Historical Bases for, and the Current Status of Pro-Religious Bias in ZoningJurisprudence
This Part delineates the origins of this favorable view of religion generally, the ways in which this notion has undergone a genuinely profound transformation over the course of American history, and the nature and scope of its modem jurisprudential manifestations. This discussion is particularly important because the problem of "religious zoning" is but one episode in an extended clash between the ecclesiastical and secular realms in American society. Thus, to understand the contours of this broader conflict is to be able to view 124 Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (quoting Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) ). 25 But see supra note 123 (discussing "hybrid situations"). 120 See sources cited supra note 6 (listing authorities that support the proposition that the government cannot prefer religion to secularism). the subject matter of this Comment in light of its broad socio-cultural import, as well as to understand its more finite constitutional implications. Indeed, both of these considerations render "religious zoning" an especially seminal issue in modem America.
As discussed above, the United States was founded by individuals who were devout in their respective faiths, and who, no doubt, viewed religious devotion as the mark of a morally righteous individual and a healthy society. While I have argued that James Madison intended to create a complete barrier between church and state, it is worth reiterating here the suggestion that he did so as a means of protecting religious liberty. It would be implausible to contend that this proreligious stance was not largely incorporated into the American mindset for decades and, it would appear, centuries to come.
However, by the late nineteenth century, the United States began to experience a trend which continues to be reflected today in both its culture and laws: a significant, yet uneasy and incomplete secularization."-" The origins of this shift may be conceived of as part of a manifestation of the influence of romanticism in American culture. The term "romanticism" is used here to refer to a spiritual transformation in nineteenth-century America-a reconfiguration of the relationship between the sacred and the secular in a society buffeted by political revolution, religious awakenings, and industrial growth. In this unsettling environment, UNI VERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 149:1507 This is not to say that America was or is not a religious place; rather, the point is merely to highlight the development of a cultural order featuring distinct spheres of thought and activity, with religion no longer the lens through which all aspects of sociopolitical life are perceived.
This general trend toward secularization was particularly pronounced during the 1960s, a time marked by prevalent popular distrust of authority of all sorts:
governmental, parental, and religious. It was such that " [b] eginning in the 1970s ... several scholars, including Andrew Greeley and David Martin, looking at evidence from the United States, began to question the 'death of God' and the 'rise of the secular city. '' 129 Paradoxically, however, the source of these thinkers' interest in the subject was growing evidence that American society was becoming less, rather than more, secular. Church membership was increasing not declining. In 1976, a born-again Baptist, Jimmy Carter, was elected President and Operation Rescue and other religious organizations were responding publicly to abortion and creationism. Millions of Americans were tuning in to televangelical religious programs such as Jim and Tammy Bakker's Praise the Lord cable network, as well as the programs ofJerry Falwell of the Moral Majority, Oral Roberts, Pat Robertson, Jimmy Swaggert, and others.
3 '
At first glance, this may appear contradictory-a trend of secularization coupled with heightened religious participation-and to a substantial degree, it is. American society had come to a point where secular pursuits had begun to dominate public life, yet the American people were becoming increasingly involved in religion. The resultant confuision, hesitancy, and intrapersonal and social 156-58 (1998) Lemon is castigated by its critics as an excessively separationist decision that overemphasizes the impregnability of the "wall of separation" between church and state. Critics who take this view also complain that the test (at least as applied) is often too rigid and inflexible in its prohibition of government accommodation of religion, so that it becomes ultimately hostile to the role of religion in American life. 130 French, supra note 129, at 512-13.
conflict, where the state and religion brushed against one another, were virtually inevitable. This phenomenon has been replicated in the legal arena. If the law lagged temporally behind in its own secularization, as possibly indicated by the fact that the Supreme Court's first major proclamation concerning the Establishment Clause, Everson v. Board of Education, was not handed down until 1947,' it stayed a parallel course. Given that law is by its nature the product of social necessity and circumstance,"' we should not find its reflection of the phenomenon of secularization surprising. In fact, Smith itself may well be perceived, from a socio-legal perspective, as a significant step in this secularization process.
Yet just as America was incomplete in its move away from a wholly religiously infused social order, by the 1970s the law of church and state was marked by uncertainty and hesitance. Thus, both the general culture within the United States and the law it spawned exhibited signs of being immersed in a spiritual-ideological quagmire. Indeed, just as the interest in the "death of God"' was provoked by what outwardly signaled an ecclesiastical resurgence, jurisprudential manifestations of the process of secularization were juxtaposed against clear doctrinal embodiments of a perception of religion as being tied to the public welfare.
A particularly stark, noteworthy example of this sort of uncertain shift in the direction of secularization may be found within the context of late twentieth-century Michigan zoning jurisprudence. In ) 11I mean here simply that when communities are sufficiently small and close-knit, the maintenance of social order may be achieved through the enforcement of informal, community-based behavioral norms. It is only when society and the interpersonal relationships between members thereof become complex and weaken that those norms lose their potency, and it is only then that formal law is a necessary instrumentality in the structuring of social relations. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHouT LAw: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DispuTES (1991) (arguing that people often resolve disputes cooperatively without regard to the laws that goxern those disputes); Cook, supra note 127, at 1437 (" [T] he pluralism that has alwa)s characterized social life in America has become more and more difficult to deny in intellectual life.").
I" French, supra note 129, at 512.
UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREV1EW [Vol. 149:1507 ordinance which operated to exclude churches from an entire village was in direct contradiction to the Constitutional provision setting forth the necessity to good government of religion, morality and knowledge. As such, the ordinance was not presumed valid and was found void.
In view of the aforesaid, we hold that the use of land for a church is recognized as bearing a real, substantial, and beneficial relationship to the public health, safety, and general welfare so as to be accorded a The interesting aspect of Kropf however, is that despite its explicit rejection of the proposition that religious uses are preferred in relation to secular ones, the court went on to hold that the total exclusion of places of worship would necessarily be justified through the fulfillment of a "heavy burden" by the governmental entity responsible for the exclusion .' Apparently satisfied that its approach (drawing a line between the complete exclusion of religious uses and their reasonable regulation) was logical, the court actually contradicted itself. How can a place of worship be denied a preferred status, yet be subject upon its total exclusion to a level of review not afforded to other uses not considered to be such an integral part of the "'spirit and genius of our free institutions and system of government and the traditions of the American people?"" 3 ' I submit that it cannot.
As demonstrated by the Michigan experience, while there has been fairly marked movement toward secularization in the de jure 14 199 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Mich. Ct. App. 1972 ) (citing Mooney v. Viii. of Orchard Lake, 53 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Mich. 1952 ). Interestingly, however, the provision of the Michigan Constitution upon which the Congregation court relied remains unchanged.
See MICH. CoNsr. art. 8, § 1 ("[R]eligion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged."). This, at least upon a prima facie evaluation, appears in and of itself to constitute a clearly worded, institutionalized preference for religion over irreligion in violation of the federal Establishment Clause.
135 215 N.W.2d 179 (Mich. 1974) .
UNIVERSITY OFPEAWSYLVANIA LAWREVJEW [Vol. 149:1507 is so not only in the abstract and in light of the history delineated above, but moreover, it is also impermissible in view of the interpretive stances taken on the Establishment Clause by the current members of the United States Supreme Court. When we examine the current Court and the views held by each Justice concerning the Clause, it is clear that the preference for religion over irreligion as manifested in an explicit or implicit partiality toward ecclesiastical land uses should be held by a majority to constitute a First Amendment violation.
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In a comprehensive survey of the Justices' varying approaches to the Establishment Clause, Lisa Langendorfer, after noting the de facto demise of the Lemon test,'" ultimately concludes thatJustice O'Connor is left "in the middle, a place that has become quite familiar to her.""'5
Justice O'Connor favors an "endorsement" test whereby governmental action that has the effect of creating a "symbolic union" 6 between state authority and "religion,"" as perceived by the See id. at 708 (stating that although the Lemon test has yet to be formally overruled, it has been functionally abandoned by most of the justices, as it has been considered overly "hostil[e] toward religion"); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (implementing a test consisting of the following three parts: (I) does the measure in question have a secular purpose?; (2) does it have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion?; and (3) does it involve an excessive entanglement with religion?).
14, Langendorfer, supra note 143, at 725. Her analysis, in fuller form, is as follows: At one end of the spectrum, the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia, and Justice Thomas are unlikely to find a violation of the Establishment Clause in any case absent direct government coercion. Justice Kennedy is one step closer to the middle in that he would find a violation where there is indirect coercion, if the coercion is obvious and perhaps directed at school-aged children. At the other end of the spectrum is Justice Souter, who would find a violation in any case showing favoritism to a particular religion or to religion generally. In his opinion, anything short of complete neutrality is unacceptable. Justice Stevens is also likely to find Establishment Clause violations due to the presumption he would apply against the government in the cases of religious displays on public property. Justice Ginsburg and Justice Breyer seem to fit somewhere toward this side of the spectrum, although it is unclear exactly where they stand. This leaves Justice O'Connor in the middle, a place that has become quite familiar to her. Id. at 724-25.
146 Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985) (discussing a "symbolic union" in the context of the "effects" test), overruled on other grounds by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U. S. 203 (1985) .
populace as a whole, is deemed violative of the Clause. Justice O'Connor does not focus upon the endorsement of one particular religion over an), and all others, but is concerned with the sanctioning of religion generally. If the government sends the message that the presence of religion within our society is somehow "better" than its absence, she holds this to be an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.'
As applied to explicit and implicit preferences for religious land uses, the facilitation of the construction and maintenance of places of worship and other related uses, such as parochial schools, which would fall within the ambit of the term "religious use," conveys an impermissible pro-religious message.
Little needs to be said in order to substantiate this contention in the context of the explicit preference for religious uses; by their plain meanings, statements such as " [a] religious use is 'clearly in furtherance of the public morals and general welfare ' r "'" convey the message that religion is better than irreligion.
As for the implicit preference for religious uses, although the conveyance is effectuated more subtly, the message is the same. By excusing places of worship from requirements necessarily met by other land uses, courts indicate that these uses are different from others. Unless the selection of religious uses is simply arbitrary, which is patently untenable, or a product of a broad reading of Smith, which is jurisprudentially indefensible, they must be singled out on the basis of some inherent characteristic(s) that render(s) them more desirable. Put another way, courts imply that the presence of religion (as manifested in institutions that feature the explicit goal of furthering faith of one sort or another) is better than its absence. Thus, under Justice O'Connor's test, which, due to the intellectual and doctrinal middle ground occupied by its creator, may be perceived as roughly defining the approach of the Court, such .I S, Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating, in lull, that "[a] more direct infringement [of the principles embodied in the Establishment Clause) is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, fax ored members of the political community." (emphasis added)).
Id. To solve the problem of the exemption of religious land uses from neutral zoning laws of general applicability, an absolute separation between the realms of the ecclesiastical and the state must be effectuated and maintained. In the zoning context, this means that religious uses must be granted no preferential or deprecatory treatment under the law. As I will argue, such is an absolutely vital means to the preservation of religious liberty, an end the Framers unquestionably sought to realize, the worth of which remains uncontroversial. Any view on this subject will be best presented in the context of the modem discourse on the relationship between the First Amendment Religion Clauses, and therefore it is to this ongoing discussion that I now turn.
The number of scholars, jurists, and other commentators who have taken the opportunity to contribute their ideas on the proper balance between these two provisions is overwhelming, and a comprehensive survey of that body of work would also require a multivolume undertaking. Here, I aim merely to provide a small, representative sampling of some of the most interesting and prevalent I The Court had the opportunity in City of Boerne to find exactly this, but instead of addressing the validity of the RFRA on Establishment Clause grounds, Justice Stevens's concurrence aside, it kept with one of the themes dominating the current Court-a heightened emphasis on principles of federalism-and used City of Boerne to continue a line of cases narrowly construing the remedial enforcement power afforded intellectual strains and ultimately to elaborate upon my own suggestion.
It is important to realize at the outset that a perfect reconciliation of the Religion Clauses may well be unattainable. As one scholar has stated, " [t] he very natures of church and state have made their separation frustratingly difficult. Each is authoritative, each is capable of exercising power in the public sphere with great alacrity, and each is more than willing to use the other to accomplish its own ends."" 3 Indeed, even Justice O'Connor, despite her advocacy of the endorsement test, has acknowledged the elusiveness of a "Grand Unified Theory. " 5' Yet while any possible balance between the clauses may be flawed, this should not preclude efforts to minimize the friction when the clauses do collide.
Significantly, a person's views on this particular subject are necessarily a product of her notion of the proper role of government vis-A-vis religion in American political and civil society.'55 For example, Professor Monsma believes that the purpose of the Supreme Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence is to "assure government's neutrality toward religion. By not supporting or favoring one religious doctrine or group over another, and by favoring neither religion nor nonreligion, neutrality or evenhandedness is presumably maintained.""' He claims that in practice, however, this has translated into a system that "[i]mplicitly ... supports secularism.' ' 5 7 This is so, he argues, because:
[i]f one removes all positive, supportive references to religion from all the wide-ranging programs of the comprehensive administrative state... morality, values, and human goals are being considered and taught, Hamilton, supra either explicitly or implicitly, only in terms of the "well-being of mankind in the present life, to the exclusion of all considerations drawn from belief in God." Government is not being neutral between religion and an irreligious secularism; secularism is being favored and advanced over theistic religion.158
As a proposed solution, Monsma advocates a theory of "positive neutrality." Under this approach, religious liberty is not perceived as a negative freedom, i.e., one which will flourish in the absence of governmental inhibition.
It is instead something that requires cultivation, and thus, under this normative prescription, government must "take certain positive steps if it is to be truly neutral in the sense of assuring equal freedoms and... opportunities for religious persons and groups and for religious and irreligious persons and groups alike."
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Monsma uses the example of a military cemetery and asks whether tombstones featuring the cross or the Star of David should be excluded. In arguing in the negative, Monsma contends that only by "the active, positive use of religious symbols corresponding to the... faiths of the fallen men and women"' 6 0 is religion "recognized and given its due." 6 " In order to be truly neutral among all religions and between religion and irreligion, he continues, appropriate Islamic and secular humanist symbols should also be developed so that adherents to those beliefs may be represented as well. Only this sort of approach, he concludes, would be truly neutral.
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As an alternative to theories focusing on neutrality, 1 1 3 Professors Eisgruber and Sager espouse an "equality theory." According to this conception, "government's fundamental obligation is to treat all deep M8 MONSMA, supra note 6, at 40-41 (citation omitted). 23-27 (1997) (contending that the exemption of religiously motivated conduct, but not secular acts from neutral, generally applicable laws is justified by neutrality theory); Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 313, 331 (1996) (contending that it is "essential to the pursuit of religious neutrality [that] the law should protect nontheists' deeply held conscientious objection to compliance with civil law to the same extent that it protects the theistically motivated conscientious objection of traditional believers"); McConnell & Posner, supra note 4, at 37-38 (discussing "incentive neutrality").
personal commitments equally, regardless of whether those commitments are secular or religious, mainstream or unusual."'6 Underpinning this proposal is the notion that the exemption of religiously motivated conduct from general laws proposed by neutrality theory, standing alone, "radically favors religious motivation, by giving it and it alone a presumptive immunity from state regulation.
It is precisely this favoritism which is normatively indefensible, and precisely this favoritism which makes exemption seem so much like subsidy. Redescribing it as neutrality does not solve the problem on either score."1 6 5
This theory is notable for its insistence that "there is nothing sufficiently unique about religion that justifies assigning it a fundamentally distinct status in constitutional law." ' I Moreover, Sager and Eisgruber assert that " [t] here is no coherent normative basis for insisting that religious commitments receive better treatment than other, comparably serious commitments-and, as a result, it will be impossible to identify any principled stopping point for the Free Exercise claims [that would not inevitably run afoul of the equality principles within the Constitution]."' ' These scholars suggest that the Smith Court was correct in upholding neutral, generally applicable laws against a Free Exercise challenge.
Taking issue with this contention is Professor Alan Brownstein, who describes his own "liberty, equality and speech theory ' ' 8 as a "form of quid pro quo approach." '6 9 Specifically, it might be characterized as advocating the return by the Free Exercise Clause of some of the privileged status that the Establishment Clause removes from religion."" This view does treat religion as being special for purposes of ascertaining its proper constitutional status, and would exempt religiously motivated conduct from neutral laws of general applicability and treat religious institutions differently than secular A more nuanced, alternative approach recognizes that religious and secular beliefs and practices need not always be treated in the exact same way by government. Sometimes religious liberty concerns justify treating religious beliefs, practices, and institutions more favorably than their secular counterparts.
Sometimes religious equality (and liberty) concerns justify treating religious activities and organizations in a facially less favorably way than secular ones. Moreover, under this analysis, there is no fair and logical way to adopt only one side of the equation.
T 1
Brownstein's suggestion is something of a dynamic ledger approach, in which the implementation of regulatory exemptions for religion and associated activities (in other words, pro-religious incentives) justify the provision of countervailing incentives mandated by the Establishment Clause, thus moving the system closer, in the broad view, to an equilibrium position.' 7 3
These perspectives yield differing results when applied to religious land uses and neutral zoning laws. The approach advocated by Monsma, it seems, would demand that religious uses be afforded preferential treatment, as the very existence of places of worship is necessary if religion is to be afforded the opportunity to gain a foothold in American society equal to that enjoyed by secular employments.
Given that the absence of a common law preference for religious land uses (and the resultant applicability of neutral zoning laws) could serve to exclude synagogues, temples, mosques, and the like, a doctrine that renders religious uses subject to neutral regulations" T would be viewed as supporting secularism instead of genuine neutrality, and would therefore be undesirable. Monsma would likely disagree with my argument concerning the lack of tension between the Free Exercise Clause and the applicability of neutral regulations to religious uses, if not as a matter of actual jurisprudence then in terms 171 See id.
172 Id. at 276. 173 See id. at 249 (advocating a more holistic approach in using "constitutional standards to further the goal of incentive neutrality").
174 See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879-80 (1990) (maintaining that the Free Exercise Clause permits application of neutral, generally applicable laws to religiously motivated actions). of normative doctrine. He would certainly take issue with the idea that the Establishment Clause precludes such institutionalized favoritism as is embodied in exemptions for places of worship.
The equality-based notion advocated by Eisgruber and Sager would completely diverge from Monsma's view. Given that they fail to perceive an) legitimate basis for distinguishing between ecclesiastical and secular entities insofar as neutral, generally applicable laws are concerned, they would likely agree with the contentions made thus far in this Comment.
Finally, Professor Brounstein would agree with Monsma, and for similar reasons. Instead of viewing favoritism for religious uses as necessary to avoid a pro-secular doctrinal regime, he would likely view such preferential treatment for the very physical structures in which religious practice usually transpires as a necessary means of ensuring the continued liberty to worship as contemplated by the Free Exercise Clause. 7 -' My own notion of the proper balance between the clauses lies closest to that espoused by Eisgruber and Sager, although there is a significant divergence between their preferred view and my own. On a more rudimentary level, I disagree in principle with the theoretical underpinnings of the views advocated by Monsma and Brownstein. I do not believe that, as Monsma contends, the neutrality doctrine is actually a thinly veiled, tacit espousal of secularism. In fact, the view that religion must be affirmatively promoted in order to achieve genuine neutrality between religion and irreligion mistakes a system that advocates neither of these positions for one that affirmatively endorses the absence of faith-centered belief. Simply stated, to refuse to endorse religion is not to advocate nonecclesiasticism any more than a refusal to endorse a system of affirmative action is to espouse racism. Certainly some who oppose affirmative action do so as a means of facilitating the realization of a racist end, but equally certainly, some individuals who are deeply committed to racial equality are not proponents of affirmative action. 76 Similarly, it is 17 Brownstein has explicitly aired his disagreement with the result in Smith. See Brojwnstein, supra note 165, at 276 (arguing that the expansive application of neutral review of "governmental distinctions between the secular and the sacred cannot help but jeopardize Free Exercise exemptions").
As three of many potential examples, one might consider the views of Justice possible to be highly committed to the tenets of a particular faith and still believe that the government should take no part in advocating that view. When governmental authorities actively refuse to endorse religion, they are not endorsing secularism-instead they are merely relegating such issues of faith to their appropriate sphere: the individual conscience. Moreover, I do not believe, as Brownstein does, in the desirability of a First Amendment jurisprudence that balances the dictates of the Religion Clauses on a case-by-case basis, with favoritism sometimes, but not always, beingjustified. Not only is this inconsistent with Smith and with the historical meaning of the Religion Clauses, but such an approach would also place a particularly sensitive area of constitutional doctrine in an inherently standardless, exploitable adjudicatory mode, subject to manipulation at the whim of a swing Justice's fancy. It would also result in the absence of effective signposts to governmental entities indicating which types of actions vis-:k-vis religious land uses, and indeed religion in general, would constitute acceptable accommodation and which would cross the line drawn by the Establishment Clause.
Most fundamentally, I disagree with these scholars in their contention that the state may in any way, explicitly or implicitly, endorse or promote religion without running afoul of the Establishment Clause.
For religious land uses to be afforded preferential treatment by the state, no matter how subtle that favoritism might be, inherently conveys the message that the government officially endorses religion generally. This is unacceptable not only because it is facially inconsistent with the ideas held by Madison and Jefferson and manifested in that Clause, but further because the ability of the state to take a pro-religious stance threatens to undermine the religious liberty sought by many who advocate such a broad construction of governmental power. Indeed, the complete separation of the religious and political realms is crucial because it prevents government from intermingling in any way with religion. If this prohibition is removed in the manner suggested by Monsma and Brownstein, the security enjoyed by the American citizenry to worship, and indeed to believe as they wish, would become instantlyjeopardized. If government is free to aid religion, there is no principled basis for holding that it is not free to denigrate it as well. This result would be directly contrary to the end that Monsma and Brownstein advocate and for which the Framers so diligently strove.
Eisgruber and Sager, on the other hand, come closer to articulating a viable means of balancing the Clauses. By contending that neutral regulation of religion is constitutionally unproblematic, the), demonstrate a historically and pragmatically more defensible reading of the Establishment Clause, and avoid the hyper-expansive reading of the Free Exercise Clause that marks the analyses of Monsma and Brownstein. Their insistence upon equal governmental treatment of all sorts of personal commitments is well placed. However, they are incorrect in asserting that:
The Constitution singles out religious liberty for special attention, but that attention centers on the ideal of equal regard, pursuant to which the deep concerns of religious believers are protected against hostility, indifference, or a failure of comprehension, and assured equal stature with the deep concerns of other citizens. The Constitution emphatically does not privilege religious concerns.177
Quite the contrary, not only is religion singled out by the Constitution for special attention, but that emphasis does take the form of privilege. By insisting upon absolute neutrality among religions and between religion and irreligion, the Constitution emphatically does privilege religion in a broad sense: it is uniquely afforded a guarantee of survival while other modes of activity are not so protected. Unlike camping, jetskiing, or minor league baseball,"" religion may not be dismantled or singularly targeted for unfavorable treatment by the state. It is important to realize that inherent in the "singling out" of religious activity, in the manner effectuated by the Constitution, is the bestowal of a specially protected status upon it.
Thus, religious land uses must be subject to neutral laws of general applicability. In more general terms, few argue that religion may be uniquely denigrated, as such actions would clearly constitute a Free Exercise violation of the primary order. Crucially, however, equally fatal shortcomings exist in arguments to the effect that religion and its attendant activities and facilities should be elevated over any other sort of land use or activity. To thus breach the wall between church and state would subject religious liberty to the will of a popularly accountable legislature, and thus to faction and the transient passions of the electorate. Madison valued the freedom of conscience far too much to leave it so vulnerable.
It is the legacy of the Framers' convictions that we Americans have inherited, and it is their fundamental goals that we must strive to implement. We must therefore effectuate a complete separation, keeping foremost in mind the ideas that religion is special, and that we are zealously guarding religious liberty. The Constitution was drafted by individuals who so prized their faith that they took great care to secure it from governmental usurpation. To understand its Religion Clauses is to appreciate that exemptions for religious uses from neutral, generally applicable zoning laws destroy that security.
